[Ccs] FW: Cuban Studies list: USIS statement; Exiles' post-Castro plan; Bush call a violation of OAS Charter; Guerra sorda contra Cuba

Barrios, Maura barrios at iac.usf.edu
Tue Feb 24 15:23:24 EST 2004



>From: "La Alborada" >Reply-To: >To: "La Alborada" >Subject: 04-02-23 Nuevas: USIS statement; Exiles' post-Castro plan; Bush call a violation of OAS Charter; Guerra sorda contra Cuba >Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2004 01:42:19 -0500 > > >La Alborada >Cuban American Alliance Education Fund >1010 Vermont Avenue NW #620, Washington, D.C. 20005 >nuevas at earthlink.net • www.cubamer.org >____________________________________________________________________________ >________________________________ > >23 febrero 2004 > >-- Statement by U.S. Interests Section Chief of Mission, James Cason >-- Exiles offer post-Castro Cuba plan >-- Bush Call for Regime Change in Cuba Violates OAS Charter >-- El Herald: La guerra sorda contra Cuba >____________________________________________________________________________ >________________________________ > > > >UNITED STATES INTERESTS SECTION >Havana, Cuba > >Statement by U.S. Interests Section Chief of Mission, James Cason >(01/20/2004) > >President Bush has said repeatedly that U.S. policy toward Cuba is a rapid, >peaceful transition to democracy, a transition that will come from Cubans >themselves. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said last spring that the >U.S. Government did not need to take military action against Cuba, since the >Cuban regime was an anachronism and would eventually fall of its own weight. >U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said clearly that the U.S. >Government has no plans for military action against Cuba. The U.S. >Government reiterates once again that there is no reason for the U.S. to >attack Cuba and that the U.S. Government has no intention of doing so. > >Last year the Cuban Foreign Minister suggested that we were slowing down the >processing of travel documents for Cubans migrating to the U.S. to create a >mass migration crisis as a pretext for war, which of course was untrue. The >U.S. Interests Section asked MINREX to allow Mr. Cason to address the Cuban >public through Cuban newspapers and television to tell the Cuban public >directly that we had no intention to attack or invade Cuba. We were trying >to reassure the Cuban people. The Cuban government did not allow it. > >The Cuban government is fabricating the "threat" of a U.S. military attack >to engender fear in the Cuban population, to spend scare resources to >maintain large military, security and intelligence structures, and to >justify extreme measures in a vain attempt to crush Cuba's nascent >independent civil society. > >____________________________ > >The Miami Herald > >Posted on Sat, Feb. 21, 2004 > >Exiles offer post-Castro Cuba plan >A proposal released by Cuban-American congressional leaders and members of >Cuban exile groups offers a blueprint for a transition to democracy. >BY OSCAR CORRAL >ocorral at herald.com > >Cuban-American congressional leaders and members of anti-Castro exile >organizations Friday unveiled one of the most comprehensive proposals to >date of how to proceed with a transition to democracy and a social market >economy in a post-Castro Cuba. > >The sweeping study is a clear indication of the vision some exile leaders >have for the island that they fled years ago. > >It calls for the privatization of joint ventures between the government and >foreign investors, endorses the right of urban property dwellers in Cuba to >remain in their homes as long as old private owners are properly >compensated, and suggests that government-owned land be redistributed to >small- and medium-sized private farmers to help foster a middle class. > >Congressional leaders say they hope it will provide input to the Bush >administration's post-Castro plans. > >''We will make sure that this plan becomes part of the Bush commission,'' >said U.S. Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart, R-Miami. ``The solution of Cuba is not >in Washington, but to have freedom. We insist that Cuba has to have >plurality.'' > >The proposal is also a clear rejection of dissident Osvaldo Payá's Proyecto >Varela, a referendum signed by thousands of Cubans to create change on the >island by working within the communist constitution. > >''It's important for us to set the tone that there will be no fundamental >change in Cuba's system if you go along with the constitution drafted by >Fidel Castro,'' said U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. ``This sets up a new >path.'' > >But by laying out a blueprint counter to Payá's Varela project, conservative >exile leaders may be widening the gap that exists between them and more >moderate-minded Cuban Americans who support that effort. > >Díaz-Balart, his brother, U.S. Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart, R-Miami, and >Ros-Lehtinen reject the Varela project because they feel it does not go far >enough in its intended reforms. > >More moderate exiles disagree. > >''It seems sad that the efforts of these exiles is to derail the cause that >dissidents in the island are carrying out,'' said Jose Basulto, former head >of Brothers to the Rescue. ``These are the plans of people who have no >plans. If they really had plans, they'd be planning the fall of Castro and >how to carry that out.'' > >Many other high-profile exiles have expressed their support for the Varela >Project, including Archbishop Agustín Roman; Joe Garcia, executive director >of the Cuban-American National Foundation; and Carlos Saladrigas, a >prominent Cuban American businessman. > >Saladrigas said Friday that any proposed plan is positive because it can >help foster a healthy debate. But he said it still isn't clear how proposed >changes will be achieved. > >'The `how' is what's missing from this debate,'' he said. ``Osvaldo Payá has >proposed a how. We all want democracy, liberties, institutions and >privatization, the question is how do you get there?'' > >The study, called ''Socio-Economic Reconstruction, suggestions and >recommendations for a Post-Castro Cuba,'' was prepared by Antonio Jorge, a >political economy and international relations professor at Florida >International University. > >The congressional leaders also praised the recent formation in Miami of the >Cuban Socio-Economic Reconstruction Commission, which is made up of >professionals and experts to devise ways to help the post-Castro transition >in specific fields such as housing, agriculture and economic development. > >Jorge said the goal was to create a series of principles ``to ensure that >those who want a pseudo, false transition will fail.'' > >''We have a certain vision of Cuba's future,'' Jorge said. ``Those who want >to share this view are free to do so. Those who do not are free to follow >their own inclinations.'' > >Independent observers say that it's not unusual for exiled populations to >take an active role in a post-communist transition. For example, exiled >Czechoslovakians worked closely with members of the internal dissident >movement after the fall of the Berlin wall. > >''There's no doubt that Antonio Jorge and the others who worked on this are >extremely knowledgeable on the Cuban economy,'' said Ricardo Bofil, one of >Cuba's original dissidents who now runs a human rights organization in >Miami. > >``I think they bring forth many interesting themes that will produce a >fertile debate in the future.'' > >Despite the differences over Payá, Mario Díaz-Balart insisted there was no >division between Cuban exiles. > >''Whoever says Cuban exiles are divided, let them come here today,'' said >Díaz-Balart, addressing a crowd of mostly elderly supporters at the Koubek >Center in Little Havana. > >Ros-Lehtinen said that the plan is supported by prominent dissidents in >Cuba, including Oscar Elías Biscet and Marta Beatriz Roque. > >''I think this will be accepted by the Cuban community on the island,'' she >said. > >Jorge, who worked closely with University of Miami Professor Jaime >Suchlicki, did not set out to develop a detailed blueprint for transition, >but rather a framework of principles to guide the process. > >For example, he advises that loans and credit lines should be made available >by Cuba's financial institutions to help finance the rebirth of the private >sector. He also believes that public money should be loaned to the private >sector to finance reconstruction of infrastructure, and to facilitate the >transfer of government property to private Cuban ownership. > >He recommends that promotion of individual liberties and rights should be a >priority. > >By drawing on the lessons learned from other post-communist transitions in >Eastern Europe, Jorge warns that the transition should be gradual, not >rushed. Still, the report calls for a complete change in Cuba's political >and economic system. > >Jorge said it is critical that Cuba enable its own citizens to become the >private owners of its assets -- through loans and grants -- instead of >seeing assets auctioned off on the international market. > >''I've never been a conservative, political or social,'' Jorge said. ``This >is a populist proposal.'' > >____________________________ > >Center for International Politics Cuba Project > >Bush Call for Regime Change in Cuba Violates OAS Charter > >By Wayne S. Smith and Chloe Schwabe >Feb 22, 2004 > >February 21, 2004-On the basis of badly flawed intelligence, much of it from >Iraqi exiles who wanted the U.S. to invade, and in defiance of the United >Nations, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq to bring about regime change. >There turned out to be no weapons of mass destruction and no "imminent >threat" from the existing regime. But in the ensuing invasion and >occupation, more than 500 American soldiers have been killed and thousands >wounded so far, along with many thousands of Iraqi civilians - and there is >no end in sight. > >Now the Bush Administration is planning to bring about regime change just to >our south - though, it insists (so far at least) that it will do so by >peaceful means. It has virtually closed off channels for dialogue with the >Cuban government, even in early January of this year suspending the >twice-yearly migration talks. You don't seek dialogue, you see, with a >government you intend to oust, and regime change is now the avowed objective >of the Bush Administration in Cuba. As Assistant Secretary of State Roger >Noriega put it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 2 of >last year, "the president is determined to see the end of the Castro regime >and the dismantling of the apparatus that has kept him in office for so >long." > >Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba > >To achieve that goal, the President has now appointed a Commission for >Assistance to a Free Cuba 1) "to bring about the expeditious end of the >dictatorship" [1] and 2) to develop a plan to provide assistance to the >Cuban people in a post-Castro Cuba. Commission members include all cabinet >level agencies. The core agencies responsible for its day-to-day operations, >however, include the Secretary of State (its chairman); the Secretary of >Housing and Urban Development; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary >of Commerce; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Assistant to the >President of National Security Affairs; and the Administrator of the United >States Agency for International Development (USAID). Secretary of State >Powell has appointed Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega to oversee the >day-to-day operations of the Commission. > >Questionable Goal: Regime Change > >Now, while it may seem premature to plan for assistance to the Cuban people >in a post-Castro period, no one can object to the concept, assuming that the >Cuban people and authorities, when the times comes, wish to receive such >assistance. Bringing about "the end of the Castro regime" is something else >again. The Bush Administration insists that this will be brought about by >peaceful means, and mentions assistance to the internal opposition as one of >the principal instruments to achieve its goal. But that is still in blatant >violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of >another state, embodied, for example, in the Charter of the OAS [2]. That >appears to be a matter of no concern to the Administration - not >surprisingly, since its attitude toward international law and treaty >restrictions can best be described as utterly contemptuous. > >There is nothing in international law, in the Charter of the United Nations >or in the Charter of the OAS, that would give the U.S. the right to change >the government in Cuba. Quite the contrary. But the Bush Administration goes >even further; it insists that "neither would it accept a successor regime." > >As Mr. Adolfo Franco, the USAID official who would be responsible for >providing assistance to Cuba in the supposed post-Castro period, put it at a >recent conference at the University of Iowa: "The President has said that we >will not accept a successor regime. It is the law. It is embodied in the >Helms-Burton Act" [3] > >Now, it is true that the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 lays down a whole series >of conditions that must be met by any Cuban government before we can lift >the embargo. Those include democratic elections, that neither Castro be a >part of the new government, that the new government be moving toward a free >market economy, that it have stopped jamming Radio Marti (!) and a series of >other things. But lifting the embargo is one thing, dealing with, >negotiating with, a future Cuban government is quite another. And there is >no provision in the Helms-Burton Act that would prevent us from dealing with >a future Cuban government in the same way the U.S. government dealt with the >present Cuban government from 1996 until the Bush Administration decided to >close off dialogue. The interests sections, after all, are supposed to be >channels for communication, even with the embargo still in place. > >Policy Instruments > >And how is the Administration to bring about "the end of the Castro regime?" >According to the State Department's announcement concerning the Commission >for Assistance to a Free Cuba, there are three principal instruments. > >-- Travel Crackdown. First, it will "deny revenues to the regime." Clearly, >since the U.S. buys nothing from Cuba, this will be principally a matter of >tightening up on travel controls, so that fewer Americans travel to Cuba and >spend money. But the effect of this is likely to be marginal at best. Of the >1,900,000 foreign visitors who went to Cuba last year, only some 190,000 >were Americans and less than 20% of that number would likely be affected by >the Administration's crackdown on travel, i.e. by denial of licenses under >the new and more stringent guidelines. The resulting two to three percent >reduction ( if that) in Cuban tourist revenues might be inconvenient, but it >certainly would not result in "the end of the Castro regime." > >Treasury Secretary John Snow's speech in Miami on February 9 was symptomatic >of the Administration's effort to use travel reduction as a weapon. He spoke >of "cracking down" and "cutting off American dollars headed to Castro" by >making it illegal for Americans to deal with a series of Cuban-owned travel >agencies without a license. But in fact, all American travel providers >already must have licenses to deal with those companies, so despite its >tough tone, the speech in fact changed little at all. > >And there are definite limits as to how far the Administration can go in >limiting travel. The great majority of those who travel are Cuban-Americans >going back to visit families. They have made it clear that they want to >continue that practice. Any effort to prevent them from doing so would risk >a strong counter reaction from the Cuban-American community itself - exactly >the community President Bush is supposedly courting with his "get rid of >Castro" rhetoric. > >Even so, the Administration has recently hinted at the possibility of >reducing remittances to families in Cuba and cutting back on the number of >charter flights to reduce travel. [4] But the result of that would be that >people would simply then travel through Nassau, Jamaica and Mexico. And if >the Administration tried to cut back on the remittances Cuban-Americans send >to their families on the island, those here would simply revert to sending >the money in through "mules," or couriers, as they did in years past. The >amount of travel or money going in would not be drastically reduced. The >Administration would, in effect, incur the wrath of the great majority in >the Cuban-American community to little avail. > >-- International Support. Second, the State Department announcement suggests >that the end of the Castro regime will be hastened by "encouraging >international solidarity." > >The idea, supposedly, is that we get other nations to join with us in trying >to force Castro from power. But this is simply wishful thinking. Other >nations, and especially those belonging to the European Union, do >increasingly criticize the Castro government for its repressive actions >against its own citizens, notably the massive arrest of the dissidents and >the execution of the three would-be hijackers back in March of last year. >But they have not joined - and will not join -- with us in a trade embargo >against Cuba. On the contrary, at last November's Ibero-American Summit, >Latin American governments, joined by Spain and Portugal, condemned >"extraterritorial laws and measures that are contrary to international >law"… and therefore called on the U.S. to end enforcement of the >Helms-Burton law (the same one to which the Bush Administration says we must >adhere in rejecting "a successor regime.") And, of course, the vote against >the U.S. embargo becomes more and more lopsided every year. This past year, >the vote in the General Assembly was 179 against the embargo, only three in >favor. Only Israel and the Marshall Islands voted with the U.S. - and Israel >is one of the most active states in trading with and investing in Cuba! In >other words, it votes with us, but does not cooperate with our embargo. > >Few if any cooperate with our embargo. Even fewer will join us in efforts to >oust the Castro government. As indicated above, this violates international >norms, represents blatant intervention in the internal affairs of another >state, and is exactly the kind of extraterritorial measure rejected by the >Ibero-American Summit. > >Cuba's relations with most of the Latin American states, moreover, have >actually improved. They do not wish to emulate its political or economic >system, but having suffered the consequences of the neo-liberal economic >theories encouraged by the United States, and resenting what they see as its >high-handed unilateralism, they feel a certain sympathy for Cuba's defiance >of the Colossus of the North. Thus, U.S. efforts to bring an end to the >Castro regime are likely to excite more support for Cuba than for the U.S., >especially as they directly contradict the principle of non-intervention in >internal affairs - a sacrosanct principle for the Latin Americans. > >-- Support for Dissidents. Third, and finally, the Administration cites >"support for the opposition" as a key means of bringing down the Castro >regime. But this also is wishful thinking. In their efforts to expand the >parameters for freedom of expression and civil rights in Cuba, the >dissidents deserve our moral support and expressions of solidarity. But they >do not have and are not likely to have the strength or following even to >think of bringing down the government. Nor, as most, including the >dissidents themselves, see it, is that their role. Thus, when the Bush >Administration says it will use them to bring down the Cuban government, it >places them in a false position. And it does them a distinct disservice, >making them thus appear, wrongly, as the paid agents of a foreign government >working for the overthrow of their own. This places them not only in a false >position, but in one that is most dangerous. It was precisely this >perception that helped lead, however unfairly and unfortunately, to the >massive arrests of the dissidents last March. > >Wayne Smith has discussed this dilemma with Vladimiro Roca, Oswaldo Paya, >Elizardo Sanchez and other dissidents during recent visits to Cuba. He found >that all had deep reservations about the Bush Administration's approach. All >specifically questioned the efficacy of a commission designed to plan a >transition in Cuba. "Such a plan is up to the Cuban people," Roca said, "not >to the United States." > >All said they would accept no assistance whatever from the United States >and, as Paya put it, "most of that money will stay in the pockets of people >in Miami, but the very fact that it is on the books encourages the Cuban >government to accuse us, unfairly, of receiving assistance from a foreign >power. U.S. talk of assistance, in short, doesn't help us; it harms us." > >Obviously. Unfortunately, that seems not to have dawned on the Bush >Administration or its minions in the State Department. > >Unrealistic Expectations? > >If none of its policy instruments is capable of bringing about regime >change, on what does the Administration base its expectation that the Castro >regime is coming to an end? Again, largely, it would appear, on wishful >thinking. As Mr. Franco put it at the Iowa University Conference: "The >President is convinced that given growing economic problems in Cuba and >increasing opposition, the Castro regime is entering its final phase." > >Cuba faces serious economic problems to be sure, resulting largely from the >fact that in response to the Helms-Burton Act and other factors, it put the >brakes to a reform process begun in 1993 and has never reactivated that >process. The reforms had turned the economy around, i.e., stimulated >impressive growth. In not going forward with them, Castro appears to be >trying to maintain a certain ideological purity, or, phrased another way, to >give control priority over economic pragmatism. But rather than allow >continued economic deterioration, one must assume he would at some point >turn again to reforms. As one elderly Cuban put it recently in a >conversation with Wayne Smith: "Things cannot go on the way they are. Either >we have the biological solution [i.e. Castro dies] or things get so bad that >he has no alternative to revived reforms. I expect the latter, a new reform >process." > >There is as yet no indication that Castro is moving in that direction. The >point is, however, that between collapse and reform, Castro is more likely >to choose the latter. > >Castro is now 77 and of course is not immortal. As one reads the papers >prepared by the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American >Studies on a "democratic transition" in Cuba, and listens to the statements >of Administration spokesmen such as Otto Reich (special presidential envoy >for the Western Hemisphere), Adolfo Franco and Assistant Secretary of State >Roger Noriega, it is clear that their expectation is that a regime friendly >to the United States will emerge and invite the U.S. to help rebuild and >refashion Cuba - in its own image, they would probably hope - exactly the >kind of golden vision painted for the Administration by the Iraqi exiles >before the U.S. invasion ran head-on into reality. > >What is far more likely is that Castro would be replaced by a transitional >collective leadership drawn from the present power structure. Raul Castro >might well be called President, but he would likely serve more as a chairman >of the board. And the board would likely include men such as Ricardo Alarcon >(now the President of the National Assembly), Carlos Laje (who now directs >the economy from within the Politburo), and Army General Colome Ibarra. >Indeed, the transitional leadership might include two or three of Cuba's top >generals, for the Army would be the key institution. The crucial thing is >that this transitional leadership, if it wished to retain the support of the >Cuban people, would have to move ahead rapidly with reforms. Castro has the >moral authority to hold out against them, but no one else in the leadership >does. And the Cuban people do want change -- and an economy that works >again. > >All things being equal, this transitional leadership would probably be >inclined to have a constructive relationship with the United States. >Unfortunately, the hostile attitude of the Bush Administration almost >precludes that, especially since the Administration has made it clear that a >"successor regime" would also be unacceptable - and this would be exactly >that - a successor regime. > >In a Blind Alley? > >And so, the Bush Administration's Cuba policy would seem to leave us in a >blind alley. We have virtually abandoned efforts at problem-solving through >dialogue. The Administration's objective, rather, is to get rid of the >Castro regime. But none of its means of doing so is even remotely capable of >achieving that objective. At the same time, the more hostile and threatening >our posture, the greater the tensions between the two countries and the >greater the likelihood of some kind of unfortunate incident. And if we go by >what the Administration says, that hostility - that determination to bring >about regime change - will most likely continue even after Castro passes >from the scene. Thus, it is a policy which leads no where but which by again >ignoring international norms is likely to cause the United States new >problems - especially in Latin America. > >Finally, this is a policy designed by and put forward by a distinct >minority. Polls indicate the majority of American citizens want to reduce or >eliminate controls on travel to Cuba, not increase them. Indeed, clear >majorities in the House and Senate, reflecting the will of the American >people, voted to do exactly that this past fall, only to have the resulting >amendments stripped out in blatant violation of the established procedural >rules. And why does the majority wish to neutralize travel controls? Because >they understand that we are likely to accomplish far more in terms of >encouraging a more open society in Cuba by reducing tensions and increasing >contacts between the two countries. As some in the Congress put it, if the >confrontational tactics of the Bush Administration did not actually provoke >the arrest of the dissidents last March, the crackdown was a vivid >demonstration of the failure of those tactics. > >Indeed, this is a policy not even supported by the majority in the >Cuban-American community. Polls there indicate some 55% believe the embargo >is a failed policy and that we should be looking for a new one. An even >larger percentage express determination to continue to travel to Cuba to see >their families. > >The Cuba policy now being put forward by the President, in short, is one >without public support. It is applauded by only a handful of people in Miami >and a few of their representatives in Washington. More than anything else, >it represents a perversion of democracy. > >End Notes > >[1.] Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, U.S. Department of State, >forwarded on January 22, 2004. > >[2] See, for example, OAS Charter, Chapter II, Article 3 (a) International >law is the standard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations; (b) >International order consists essentially of respect for the personality, >sovereignty and independence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of >obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law; >(e) Every state has the right to choose, without external interference, its >political, economic, and social system and to organize itself in the way >best suited to it, and has the duty to abstain from intervening in the >affairs of another state. Subject to the foregoing, the American States >shall cooperate fully among themselves, independently of the nature of their >political, economic and social systems [emphasis added]. > >As pointed out by lawyers at the OAS, moreover, although Cuban membership in >the OAS was suspended at the Punta del Este Conference in January of 1962, >for legal purposes, Cuba remains a member, and is therefore due the same >obligations for non-interference in its internal affairs as other members. > >[3] Mr. Adolfo Franco, during his luncheon address at the Symposium "Whither >Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development" at the University >of Iowa, February 6, 2004. > >[4] See an article in The Miami Herald on February 16 entitled "Money", by >David Ovale > >http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/regimechange_article.htm > >____________________________ > >La Jiribilla | Nro. 146 >La Habana > >El Herald: La guerra sorda contra Cuba > >Periódicamente, cada cierto tiempo, El Herald tiene pautado un editorial >contra Cuba. Si alguien hubiera tenido la curiosidad de coleccionar los >editoriales, y las noticias, y las columnas, podría constatar que siempre se >dice lo mismo. > >Luis Ortega | Miami > >El Miami Herald y su carnal en español mantienen, desde años, una guerra >sorda contra Cuba en venganza porque el gobierno de la Isla no permite que >los dos periódicos circulen libremente en Cuba. > >Es un pleito tan viejo que ya nadie se acuerda de cómo es la cosa y para >qué. Es casi una formalidad. Por supuesto, yo creo que es un error de Cuba. >Deberían revisar eso y permitir que el Herald circule en Cuba lo que pueda y >como pueda y ya, a estas alturas, no tiene sentido considerar que los dos >periódicos puedan ser una amenaza contra el país. Todo lo contrario. El >cubano que se ponga a leer los dos periódicos, con los hermosos artículos >que se publican en ellos, en inglés y en español, es probable que llegue a >conclusiones favorables a su país. Son tantos los disparates que publican, y >son tan tendenciosos sus artículos, que no le hacen daño al país. A través >de los años, han ido exagerando las cosas hasta que ya están operando en un >nivel de la realidad cubana que solamente existe en la imaginación de los >que escriben siempre lo mismo. > >Periódicamente, cada cierto tiempo, El Herald tiene pautado un editorial >contra Cuba. Si alguien hubiera tenido la curiosidad de coleccionar los >editoriales, y las noticias, y las columnas, podría constatar que siempre se >dice lo mismo. Nunca aparece nada. Tal vez, de vez en cuando, enferman a >Castro y hasta han llegado casi a matarlo. El tema preferido es el de las >cárceles. De acuerdo con el periódico, todos aquéllos que son condenados a >prisión se están muriendo. Están al borde de la muerte. Las prisiones son >horribles… “Fulanito está agonizando”, dicen. Y al cabo de un cierto tiempo >Fulanito aparece en la radio y la televisión en Miami, gordo y reluciente, >contando su tragedia. > >Claro que hay excepciones, siempre las hay, y resultaría una infamia negar >que las cárceles son horribles en todas partes. Muy especialmente en la base >naval de Guantánamo donde hay más de 500 seres humanos, provenientes de >diversos países, que llevan años encarcelados en jaulas, arrodillados, >acusados de no se sabe qué, amarrados y sin esperanzas de que les celebren >juicios. > >Toda la campaña permanente de El Herald en español y en inglés contra Cuba >se basa, precisamente, en que el gobierno no permite la circulación de los >dos diarios en la Isla. Ya los cubanos de Miami ni siquiera le exigen a El >Herald que publique cosas contra Cuba. Eso ha ido desapareciendo con el >tiempo. Los cubanos de Miami, en su gran mayoría, viajan a Cuba >constantemente y saben más de la Isla que los dos periódicos. No necesitan >que El Herald les cuente historias. > >En el editorial que publicaron ayer le caen arriba a Christine Chanet, una >abogada, que forma parte de una Comisión de las Naciones Unidas que estudia >las violaciones de los derechos humanos. > >La mujer se ha atrevido a opinar que la tensión entre EE.UU. y Cuba ha >creado un clima que “no es favorable” al desarrollo de la libertad de >expresión y de reunión. “¡Eso es absurdo!”, clama El Herald. Están >indignados porque alguien se ha atrevido a discrepar y a encontrarle alguna >explicación a la conducta del gobierno cubano. Un gobierno que lleva 45 años >asediado y amenazado por el vecino del norte. > >Digan lo que digan en sus editoriales y artículos, la conducta del gobierno >cubano, durante 45 años, tiene que ser relacionada con la guerra que se le >ha estado haciendo desde el vecino del norte. No es posible sacar a Cuba del >contexto en que se encuentra y juzgarla sin tener en cuenta la causa de >todos los males de la Isla. > >© La Jiribilla. La Habana. 2004 > > > > 


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